Africa has made remarkable strides toward peace and stability, yet conflicts, both old and new, continue to challenge the continent’s progress with conflicts springing up across the continent from DRC to Sudan, to Ethiopia, to Libya.
From political instability and civil wars to insurgencies and border disputes, the causes of unrest are often rooted in historical, economic and ethnic divisions. The African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have made attempts to effectively manage and resolve conflicts by strengthening their institutional independence.
The AU continues to play a central role in shaping Africa’s approach to peace and security through mechanisms such as the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the African Standby Force (ASF). Similarly, regional bodies including Ecowas in West Africa, Igad in the Horn of Africa, SADC in Southern Africa and EAC in the Eastern Africa have made attempts to prevent conflicts within their regions.
These institutions provide a framework for early warning systems, diplomatic negotiations and, when necessary, military intervention. However, their effectiveness is constrained by political interference, financial constraints and lack of operational autonomy.
The failure of AU and RECs to facilitate this meeting earlier is not merely a matter of diplomatic incompetence but reflects a broader pattern of distrust where African nations themselves doubt the ability of their own regional organisations to mediate conflicts impartially and effectively.
Many African regional blocs are perceived as being dominated by influential member states that push their own geopolitical agendas.
For instance, DRC and Rwanda’s involvement in the EAC and SADC has been a point of contention, with Kinshasa accusing Kigali of leveraging its influence within these organisations to avoid accountability for its alleged support of M23 rebels.
Similarly, the DRC has accused some EAC members of favouring Rwanda due to economic and security partnerships while Rwanda has accused some SADC members of doing the same for DRC.
The structural weaknesses also stretch to limited financial autonomy. AU and REC peace operations, mediation efforts and conflict early warning systems are overwhelmingly dependent on external donors. This dependency skews priorities, slows down deployment of missions and compromises the political neutrality of peace processes.
For instance, delays in disbursing funds can paralyse critical interventions, while donor-driven agendas may push African institutions toward compromises that do not necessarily align with local realities. Without sufficient internal funding, these organizations struggle to act swiftly and assertively.
Another significant challenge is overlapping mandates and jurisdictional ambiguity between the AU and RECs. Although the principle of subsidiarity is meant to define the relationship between the AU and sub-regional bodies such as giving RECs the lead role in addressing regional conflicts, coordination remains inconsistent.
Conflicts like those in DRC, Sudan and Somalia have exposed this problem, where multiple actors attempt to take the lead or work in silos, resulting in fragmented responses, duplication of efforts and competition for legitimacy.
Moreover, political interference by member states continues to undermine the impartiality and effectiveness of mediation. In many cases, powerful member states either directly support factions within a conflict or obstruct the mediation process when it does not align with their strategic interests.
This erodes trust in regional institutions, reduces their legitimacy among warring parties, and compromises their ability to enforce peace agreements. The lack of an effective enforcement mechanism within the AU or RECs also means that member states who violate peace commitments or obstruct diplomatic efforts rarely face meaningful consequences.
There is also the issue of institutional inertia and slow response times. Despite the AU’s establishment of early warning systems like the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), translation of warnings into timely action remains weak. Bureaucratic red tape, lack of political urgency, and coordination gaps often delay preventive diplomacy until after violence has escalated.
By the time mediation efforts are launched, the human and political cost of conflict already intensified, making peaceful settlement far more difficult. Not to mention institutional capacity constraints that limit the effectiveness of mediation processes.
Finally, public disconnect and lack of inclusivity in mediation processes weaken the long-term legitimacy of peace agreements. Many peace deals brokered by regional bodies are elite-centred, often involving only governments, rebel groups or external actors, while excluding civil society, community leaders, women and youth.
This top-down approach leads to fragile settlements that lack grassroots support and fail to address the structural grievances that caused the conflict in the first place.
Benard Aloo is a Strategic Communication and International Relations Specialist
